Remarks Made at Pace University School of Law on October 23, 1993 by Rosenstock, Robert
Pace International Law Review
Volume 6
Issue 1 Winter 1994
Symposium: Should There Be an International
Tribunal for Crimes Against Humanity?
Article 9
January 1994
Remarks Made at Pace University School of Law
on October 23, 1993
Robert Rosenstock
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace
International Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert Rosenstock, Remarks Made at Pace University School of Law on October 23, 1993, 6 Pace Int'l
L. Rev. 83 (1994)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol6/iss1/9
ROBERT ROSENSTOCKt ft
I think that many of Professor Rubin's comments are inter-
esting and of importance. That the members of the interna-
tional community, acting under the Westphalian system, may
chose to exercise their authority under that system and to form
an International Court, in order to better provide rules and
methods of protecting their citizens, is not an action inherently
inconsistent with this system. It is an exercise of it. I think, in
general, Professor Rubin's comments are not such as to go to the
fundamentals of the problem, but merely to make interesting
and valuable comments on aspects of its operation.
Mr. Ferencz has given a typically spirited account of the
Nuremberg Court and the London Charter. I would like to
speak briefly on some of what happened between that period
and today and why.
First, a few comments on some of Professor Rubin's re-
marks. There are elements of victors' justice to Nuremberg and
I don't think that that's deniable. But, that does not mean that
there was injustice at Nuremberg. Not every participant in the
conflict of the Second World War was tried before that court.
Only one side was tried. There are other aspects in which it
was victors'justice. Again, not injustice. I think the idea of tak-
ing Nuremberg and using it as a base for creating an Interna-
tional Criminal Court was, in part, the recognition of the need
to go beyond what had been achieved in Nuremberg. And that's
why the international community codified a great deal of the
law that was relied upon in Nuremberg as reflective of interna-
tional custom and the League Covenant,1 the Kellog-Briand
Pact2 and other customs and usages.
t J.D. Columbia University, 1961; Mr. Rosenstock has been the Legal
Advisor for the United States Mission to the United Nations since 1964, and is the
alternate U.S. Represntative to the United Nations Security Council.
if The following is a transcription of the comments made by Mr. Rosenstock at
the symposium held at Pace University School of Law on October 23, 1993.
1 LEAGUE OF NATIONS CovENAT.
2 Kellog-Briand Pact, 1929, 94 L.NT.S. 57.
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The 1949 Geneva Convention3 and the protocols thereto,
the Genocide Convention 4 - are examples of this codification.
The question is why wasn't the Nuremberg experience built on
institutionally? Why wasn't an International Criminal Court
created right away?
The primary reason, surely, was the Cold War. The split
between East and West was such as to make any creation of an
institution such as an International Criminal Court, for that
reason alone, all but unattainable. Certainly a secondary rea-
son was one of the points which Professor Rubin has alluded to,
namely the unwillingness of states, particularly major powers,
to contemplate their own officials being called before such a
body. A tertiary reason was a host of technical problems, to
which Professor Rubin has also referred. I don't think they are
insoluble, but they are substantial.
For most of the fifties, sixties, seventies and eighties, a few
lonely voices, such as Mr. Ferencz and Professor Bassiouni and
one or two others held the torch aloft. They urged building on
Nuremberg and creating an International Criminal Court as a
standing body, but it didn't get anywhere. Then, approximately
a decade ago, work was revived on something called "Draft Code
of Crimes Against Peace and Security".5 Partly because a code
does suggest having a legal body to apply it, and partly for
purely cynical reasons - those who opposed the idea of a draft
code thought a good way to sink it would be to tie it to a court -
the idea of an International Criminal Court was revived. The
Soviet Union at that point drooled at the thought of the agita-
tion propaganda possibilities that would flow from a draft code.
But they did not want anything to do with the court.
Then, the Cold War ended. We had Pol Pot, we had Sad-
dam Hussein and we had the situation in the Former Yugosla-
via. Those who had assumed that the slogan "Never again" was
a slogan that would not have great contemporary meaning be-
cause, of course, one would never see a repeat of what had led to
3 See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
4 Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
5 Yearbook of the International Law, 1951, Vol. II, and 1954, Vol. II (New
York: United Nations, 1951, 1954).
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the existence of that slogan, began to see phrases such as "eth-
nic cleansing" used.
The International Law Commission, in 1992, began work as
a response to a lot of these developments and pressure from the
General Assembly which was itself reflecting responses to these
developments. The Commission began work on a statute for an
international criminal court. It sketched a rough outline of
what such a court might look like. It laid down certain basics;
that it should be established by statute in the form of a treaty;
that it should have jurisdiction over private persons, not states;
that its jurisdiction should extend to specify international trea-
ties in force, defining crimes of an international character. The
jurisdiction would be by consent, similar to that in Article 36 of
the Statute of the ICJ.6 Also, that it wouldn't be a standing full
time body, but would meet as required.
Then, the General Assembly in the Fall of 1992 told the
Law Commission to go ahead and draft on that basis. In the
Spring of 1993, an Ad Hoc Tribunal was created by the Security
Council. The Committee produced a preliminary draft in the
Summer of 1993 which is before the current General Assembly
and is that which governments will be commenting on over the
next week or two. I think that most of the comments will be
generally favorable. I do not think that very many governments
will have the temerity to flatly oppose the idea of such a court.
The subject matter jurisdiction that the Commission sug-
gests are grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations
of the laws or customs of war, genocide, crimes against human-
ity and crimes under the terrorism conventions. This is also
substantially the same pattern as followed in the creation of the
Ad Hoc Tribunal on Yugoslavia to which a lot of reference has
been made by previous speakers.
To what extent the problems various previous speakers
have referred to will create impenetrable barriers to success for
the Ad Hoc Tribunal will prove itself over the course of time.
Suffice it to say that the Security Council created the body
under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter.7 This gives rise to bind-
6 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055 (1945), TS No.
933. Art. 36.
7 Signed at San Francisco on June 26, 1945; entered into force on Oct. 24,
1945, 1976 Y.B.U.N. 1043.
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ing obligations to cooperate with the Tribunal, and therefore, a
request to a state to extradite somebody will give rise to a bind-
ing legal obligation. If that individual is not extradited, that
individual will, at a minimum, be unable to leave whatever
state it is that he's in that is not willing to extradite him. He
will be under an expansive house arrest.
Moreover, the Security Council has demonstrated in the
case of Libya, to which reference was made, that when Libya
refused to honor a request from the Security Council to make
the suspects believed responsible for the downing of Pan Am
103 and the UTA, a French airline in Africa, available for trial,
the Security Council was prepared to invoke economic sanctions
against Libya. The Security Council is now in the process of
tightening those sanctions, I think it is very premature to sug-
gest that the process won't work.
I also think that although the problems with the Tribunal
for Yugoslavia and an International Criminal Court are easy to
set out, this is a moment when a variety of forces have come
together to make possible the progress that has been made to-
ward the creation of an Ad Hoc Tribunal for Yugoslavia and the
drafting of an international statute. We ought to give it a try.
If it doesn't work, it doesn't work. Some of the problems to
which Professor Rubin referred may very well be acute and in-
capable of solution. I don't think any of the problems are funda-
mental or systemic. I think almost all, if not all, of them can be
dealt with as we operate the system and therefore, I don't think
this is a moment we should miss by hesitating, by being unwill-
ing to give it a try. A great deal will depend on how the Ad Hoc
Tribunal works, but a great deal will also depend on how many
of the problems raised by Professor Rubin, and that will be
raised by delegations in the Sixth Committee, can be resolved or
ameliorated by the International Law Commission at its 1994
session.
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